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FORTHCOMING IN SECRETS OF LAW (STANFORD 2007) (AUSTIN SARAT ED.) 
BERNADETTE MEYLER 
TRANSPARENCY AND TEXTUALITY: WILKIE COLLINS’ LAW BOOKS 
 
I Transparency in Law and Literature 
 The rhetoric of democracy, particularly when correlated with the attempt to 
spread the rule of law, often insists upon the ever-increasing transparency of political and 
legal institutions, relying on the visibility of the mechanisms of power and law to obviate 
any of their adverse effects.  The mantra of transparency is invoked throughout the pages 
of eminent law reviews: “If opacity frustrates and misleads outsiders [to the American 
criminal justice system], transparency and fuller disclosure can alleviate these 
problems”i; “Transparency is a core good governance attribute: Open procedures 
contribute to virtually all of the foundations of legitimacy . . . .”ii; and “transparency in 
recent years has developed from a buzzword into a substantive policy tool, particularly in 
efforts to make transnational actors more socially and environmentally responsible.”iii  
Although some question the transformative potential of transparency,iv efforts to achieve 
it are not about to disappear.  Nor is the goal of transparency all that new.  Since at least 
the seventeenth century, and probably earlier, law reformers have urged mechanisms for 
increasing transparency in the system.  Under Cromwell, English law reformers proposed 
not only that courts post fees for each particular transaction so that it would be difficult 
for judges and other judicial personnel to charge extortionate rates, but even that the laws 
be simplified and redacted into a single book.v  As Dickens’ Bleak House vividly 
dramatizes with its depiction of the London fog that seems to emanate from the law 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962746
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courts, nineteenth-century law reformers likewise objected to the obfuscation of law and 
procedure in the Court of Chancery.vi  
 Both historically and today, law reform efforts aimed at increasing transparency 
often focus on the possibilities for access to knowledge about the law.vii  One mode of 
achieving such access may be textual, through the dissemination of law reports, the 
publication of treatises explaining legal principles, and the production of volumes 
containing statutory enactments.  To the extent that those attempting to promote 
transparency try to achieve this objective through generating a proliferation of texts, law 
may yet stubbornly refuse to unlock its secrets.  The very form of textuality may prevent 
the attainment of transparency.  Contrary to the Habermasian claims for the efficacy of 
dialogue or the Gadamerian insistence on hermeneutic understanding, the legal text may 
resist releasing its secrets.  At several points in his work, Jacques Derrida gestured 
towards a critique of the value of transparency and an insistence that the “democracy to 
come” be linked with an absolute right to the secret, a secret itself connected with 
literature. 
The idea of achieving democratic agreement through pursuing transparency 
excludes, for Derrida, the possibility of the secret:  
In consensus, in possible transparency, the secret is never broached/breached 
[entame].  If I am to share something, to communicate, objectify, thematize, the 
condition is that there be something non-thematizable, non-objectifiable, non-
shareable.  And this ‘something’ is an absolute secret, it is the ab-solutum itself in 
the etymological sense of the term, i.e., that which is cut off from any bond, 
detached, and which cannot itself bind; it is the condition of any bond but it 
Electronic copy of this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=962746
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cannot bind itself to anything—this is the absolute, and if there is something 
absolute it is secret.viii   
Derrida further suggests that complete transparency may not be politically desirable, 
associating the loss of the secret with the becoming totalitarian of democracy: “I have an 
impulse of fear or terror in the face of a political space, for example, a public space that 
makes no room for the secret.  For me, the demand that everything be paraded in the 
public square and that there be no internal forum is a glaring sign of the totalitarianization 
of democracy.  I can rephrase this in terms of political ethics: if a right to the secret is not 
maintained, we are in a totalitarian space.”ix  Elsewhere elaborating upon the dynamics of 
the secret, which is not a secret intentionally concealed by a self-present subject nor an 
inscription within a private as opposed to a public space, but rather a lack of response to a 
particular call, Derrida links this secret to the specifically modern place of literature.x 
Literature provides the paradigm for the secret, and Derrida refers to “the exemplary 
secret of literature.”xi  Literature itself he then connects with democracy, maintaining that 
“[l]iterature . . . ties its destiny to a certain noncensure, to the space of democratic 
freedom (freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc.).”xii  A democracy that eschewed 
the totalitarian would, therefore, embrace the exemplary secret of literature.  The secret of 
literature may, however, also constitute the secret of law.  Despite the multiplication of 
sources of law, the very textual form of these sources may retain its secrets, and, in doing 
so, keep the secrets of law.   
 Derrida himself indicates such a possibility in “Before the Law,” his essay on the 
Kafka parable of the same name.  The parable describes a scene in which a doorkeeper 
stands “before [Vor] the law”; when a man from the country seeks admission to the law, 
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the door to which is open, the doorkeeper refuses, and continues to defer him, until the 
supplicant nears death.  In response to the man from the country’s final question, “how 
does it happen that for all these many years no one but myself has ever begged for 
admittance?,” the doorkeeper shouts, to make himself heard despite the questioner’s 
decline, “No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you.  
I am now going to shut it.”xiii  As Derrida emphasizes, the man from the country thinks 
“the Law . . . should surely be accessible at all times and to everyone.”xiv  The openness 
of the law is not, however, to be construed as the same as its accessibility, precisely 
because the law must be read.  The hypothesis that Derrida furnishes is that perhaps 
“[B]eing able to read makes the law less accessible still.”xv  The mistake of the man from 
the country, on this account, would consist in his desire “to see or touch the law, . . . to 
approach and ‘enter’ it” without recognizing that “the law is not to be seen or touched but 
deciphered.”xvi  Confronted by the representative of the law, the man from the country 
believes he should have access to the law itself instead, an expectation that misconstrues 
the relation between the individual and the law, through which “S/he presents himself or 
herself before representatives: the law in person, so to speak, is never present, even 
though the expression ‘before the law’ seems to signify ‘in the presence of the law.’”xvii  
The law is, thus, mediated through its representatives—but also through its texts; to the 
extent that law is accessible only through its appearance, Derrida suggests, “the law, 
without being itself transfixed by literature, share[s] the conditions of its possibility with 
the literary object.”xviii 
 There subsists a historical dimension to this relation between law and literature, 
and between the secrets preserved by the texts of each.  The nineteenth century, in 
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particular, witnessed an explosion of novelistic production, but also a vast increase in 
legal documentation, from treatises, to nascent law reviews, to popularized trial reports.  
The increasing volume of literary production generated anxiety that the act of reading 
would be transformed, becoming cursory and superficial.xix  The explosion of genres 
suited to mass audiences likewise crystallized concerns that literature might corrupt 
society.xx  These fears resulted, in part, in attempts to discipline readers and reading, and 
to guide their taste.xxi  The growing proportion of female readers was of most concern; as 
James Machor has observed of the Antebellum period in America, “when reviewers 
addressed the relation between the production and consumption of fiction, their remarks 
frequently were coded in gender specific assumptions about how readers responded to 
fiction and how they should read if rightly informed.”xxii 
 Nor did novelists themselves stand at a significant remove from these discussions.  
On the contrary, they meditated self-consciously on the audience they were increasingly 
able to address.  As Patrick Brantlinger has noted of one extremely popular genre, the 
sensation novel, “sensation novels are always allegories of reading.”xxiii  Wilkie Collins, 
one of the foremost of these sensation novelists, wrote in the periodical Household Words 
in 1858 that “The Unknown Public is, in a literary sense, hardly beginning, as yet, to 
learn to read.  The members of it are evidently, in the mass, from no fault of theirs, still 
ignorant of almost everything which is generally known and understood among readers 
whom circumstances have placed, socially and intellectually, in the rank above them. . . .  
The future of English fiction may rest with this Unknown Public, which is now waiting to 
be taught the difference between a good book and a bad.”xxiv  The attention of this 
“unknown public” was not reserved entirely for the consumption of literature, but rather 
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as several of Collins’ own novels suggest, directed itself as well to the popular texts of 
law, from William Blackstone’s widely disseminated Commentaries on the Laws of 
England to the embellished accounts of criminal trials provided by various pamphlets.   
As the example of Collins’ work demonstrates, the accessibility of more legal writing to a 
greater audience did not, for nineteenth-century observers, always mean that the law was 
rendered more transparent.  Rather, problems akin to those that affected Collins’ 
“unknown public” might plague naive readers of the law.  For Collins, among others, the 
increased accessibility of law meant not that its secrets were revealed, but rather that they 
were differently kept; readers’ approach to the text of law demonstrated the impediments 
to acquiring a hermeneutically ideal understanding of its content, but also, and more 
radically, revealed the deficiencies inherent in all efforts to textualize the law.    
 
II Acts of Reading Law and Literature 
In the fall of 1882, a letter arrived from London for Albany prosecutor Nathaniel 
Moak, a trial lawyer responsible for the conviction of a number of notorious nineteenth-
century criminals.  Postmarked August 21 of that year, the missive had been penned by 
English crime novelist Wilkie Collins, and thanked the prosecutor for sending Collins a 
copy of a volume containing Moak’s argument in the trial of Jesse Billings for the murder 
of his wife.  This was a case on which government resources had been heaped and which 
had resulted in not only one, but two, successive trials.  The book Collins received had 
included Moak’s “Closing Argument at the Saratoga Oyer and Terminer on the part of 
the people, in the case of The People against Jesse Billings, Jr.” dated Monday, Oct. 7, 
1878, as well as Justice Landon’s Charge to the Jury.  These had been reported by Noel 
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C. Andrews, Esq., and were followed by an odd document from a series called 
“Contributions to Medical Jurisprudence,” which contained a doctor’s 1881 review of the 
medical testimony from Billings’ second trial.xxv  Collins’ letter addressed Moak as 
follows: 
My Dear Sir, 
I can only trust to this kindness which has presented me with an interesting 
addition to my little library to excuse this late expression of my thanks.  When the 
“Argument” reached me, I waited to write, in the hope of finding a fit opportunity 
to become one of your readers without much delay.  But my literary labours … in 
the way—and there … my doctor prescribed a lazy holiday.  I accepted an 
invitation to visit with a friend … —and here I am . . .  reading your pages with 
the present interest, to say nothing of the “agreeable surprise” of finding The 
Moonstone borrowed by a favourable allusion, in a Court of Justice.  The mental 
capacity which can make itself acquainted with an immense accumulation of 
facts—present them one after another in their proper order, and draw from them 
the crucial inferences, all steadily forming in one and the same direction—is 
simply a matter of wonder to me.  I ask myself all sorts of simple questions 
relating to you.  Were you assailed by nervous misgivings—especially on the first 
day?  Did you never feel some little mental confusion here and there?  Did the 
appearance of the jury—their look and ways . . . —discompose you?  And in the 
interval of the argument, what did you eat and drink before going to bed?  These 
inquiries occur to a novelist—and they are followed by a novelist’s complaint.  
You seize my interest—and you don’t tell me how the terrible tale of guilt ended.  
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I look on to the last pages and see a judge’s charge, and a medical writers’ 
“Views” when I want to know whether he was found guilty and hanged.  The case 
was mentioned in our newspapers—but the end has slipped our newspapers.   
 With renewed thanks—and in the hope that I may be excused, 
        Wilkie Collinsxxvi  
On first glance, this letter seems to stage the difference between literary and legal 
perspectives.  Underlining “me” and “you”, Collins opposes himself to Moak in their 
respective capacities as novelist and prosecutor.  Whereas Moak’s own lengthy argument 
focused on constructing a plausible narrative of the crime from the range of available 
circumstantial evidence, and the succeeding medical analysis of the testimony—including 
elaborate charts and detailed drawings of a skull with a bullet hole—concentrated on 
detailed evaluation of the “facts”, Collins’ novelistic desire led him to focus on the plot 
and its ending, or, in other words, the question of whether Billings “was found guilty and 
hanged.”xxvii  Likewise, whereas the report of Moak’s argument depicts an elaborate 
process of ratiocination, expressing “[t]he mental capacity which can make itself 
acquainted with an immense accumulation of facts,” Collins wishes to know what 
emotions lay behind this virtuosic display of reason, or what fissures might have rested 
beneath the eloquent surface of the argument, inquiring about the confusion, nervousness, 
and even sleep patterns of the prosecutor.  On holiday from novel writing, Collins 
simultaneously became a novelistic reader of the report Moak sent him, supplementing 
the text as it was produced with questions characteristic of his fictional preoccupations.  
One of the burgeoning cadre of nineteenth-century “travel readers,”xxviii Collins replaced 
his work of fiction writing with the work of legal reading.  
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 On second perusal, however, the letter opens onto a number of correlations 
between litigation and literary endeavors.  As Collins notes, Moak referred at length in 
his argument to the novelist’s work The Moonstone, often deemed the first detective 
novel.xxix  Defense counsel had already drawn the jury’s attention to a number of works 
of fiction broadly conceived, including Oedipus and the Arabian Nights.  Critiquing the 
precedent provided by these texts, Moak insisted that the Arabian Nights might, in fact, 
be applicable, but only because of its framing conceit—the idea that the teller of the tales 
was spinning them out regardless of truth or falsity in order to save her own life.  To 
provide a counter-example to these literary precedents, Moak instead invoked The 
Moonstone and its representation of deductive analysis.  According to the prosecutor,  
We may safely study fiction provided we discreetly apply it, for when properly 
applied it is intended to faithfully represent humanity.  In the story of the 
Moonstone, a jewel had been stolen; detectives had been sent for to ascertain who 
was the guilty party; a door of the room from which the moonstone had been 
taken had been newly painted; upon the jamb of the door was discovered a small 
spot from which the paint had been brushed by a passing garment; the local 
detectives—or in the language of my learned friend, the ‘wolves and hyenas’ of 
the locality—had all passed it as of no importance; the city detective, with the 
experience of a life-time, regarded it as an important circumstance.  I cannot 
better give you his idea of it than by reading it, for it is an illustration by one 
skilled in human character, of the importance of a trifling circumstance . . . . [then 
quoting from the Moonstone]  That is a circumstance related in a work of fiction, 
but said to have been founded on fact—on the experience of an eminent detective. 
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. . .  It is these small circumstances which lead as unerringly to the guilty party, as 
if the finger of Providence had pointed directly to him.xxx 
Moak thus insisted that, rather than being specific to his own line of work, the mustering 
of circumstantial evidence into a coherent story pointing to the guilt of the defendant was 
a technique that none other than Collins himself had previously employed.  The language 
of Collins’ novel best encapsulated, he believed, the process of reasoning from a small 
clue to the guilt of the party accused.   
Just as Moak relied on Collins to provide a literary precedent for his own legal 
argument, Collins similarly and frequently employed legal motifs ripped from the 
headlines in his novelistic work.  The figure of aptly named female poisoner Lydia Gwilt 
in Armadale thus recapitulates the concerns with similar real-life anti-heroines like Sarah 
Chesham and Constance Wilson, who had been executed in 1851 and 1862 
respectively.xxxi Collins’ novella John Jago’s Ghost, published in installments during 
1873 and 1874, likewise played upon an American trial report,xxxii and Collins himself 
acknowledged having found the plot of The Woman in White, among other works, in a 
collection of French trials he encountered in Paris when wandering there with Charles 
Dickens.xxxiii  Not only did art imitate life in this context, but law simultaneously 
mimicked the work of fiction.   
 Finally, the kinds of questions that Collins raises about Moak’s mental state—
including his anxiety, and his relation to the jury—are questions similar to those that 
Moak himself asked about the motivations and feelings of the protagonists in his criminal 
narrative.  The principal difference is simply one of perspective.  Moak attempted to 
create a story of the case from which he was disentangled, as a neutral observer of sorts, 
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resisting the other side’s imputations as to his motivations, including the defense 
attorney’s claims that Moak desired to wrest a conviction from the case simply in order to 
rise up in the world.  Collins insists instead that the prosecutor himself is bound up in the 
tale, and that his own character must be further developed beyond the surface of how 
Moak wished to represent himself. 
 Analysis of these distinctions reveals that the crucial differentiation between 
Moak’s and Collins’ perspectives is not that between lawyer and literary figure but rather 
that between author and reader—with Moak in this context assuming the guise of the 
former and Collins that of the latter.  Collins, whose “little library” mentioned in the 
letter seems to have contained many law books,xxxiv and who also extracted legal updates 
from the newspapers and periodicals to which he refers, constructs a number of critical 
readings of law and its documentation, not only in materials like this letter but also in his 
novels.   
The nineteenth century brought with it a proliferation of printed sources, among 
them newspapers, periodicals serializing works of fiction, and even a wealth of trial 
pamphlets, some quite dramatically illustrated.  Increasingly, private libraries began to 
contain not only reports of English and American trials but even fictionalized accounts of 
historical “French trials.”  These latter “French trials” included many stories of doubled 
or mistaken identity, such as “The Return of Martin Guerre,” several following along the 
lines of the mirroring of Anne Catherick and Laura Fairlie in Collins’ own Woman in 
White.xxxv  Such tales, although legal in substrate, presented a clearly fictional exterior, 
targeted at gratifying the reader’s literary sensibilities more than at accurately depicting 
the developments in a particular case.  They derived ultimately from the extremely 
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popular twenty-volume French collection, first published in 1734, called Causes celebres 
et interessantes, a collection present in various forms in Collins’ library, as well as the 
genre of memoires judiciares, trial briefs written by barristers for consumption by the 
courts of pre-revolutionary France but also published in volumes of several thousands at 
a time for perusal by the general public.xxxvi  As Sarah Maza has demonstrated in Private 
Lives and Public Affairs, the memoires judiciares self-consciously partook of the literary, 
playing upon the motifs of contemporary drama and fiction: “The new genre of trial 
briefs that appeared with the Morangies case drew on the subject matter of the drame.  It 
also adopted some of the drame’s style and technique, its use of hyperbole, exclamation, 
faltering speech, and the awkward emphasis on identity and state of mind that served as 
signposts to a theater audience.”xxxvii   
 The status of the French trial, in Collins’ own representation, accords in many 
respects with that of the French novel.  The latter serves the role of transporting the 
reader beyond the mundane confines of daily life; on the first night of his visit to 
American relatives in order to obtain some rest, the English lawyer-narrator of John 
Jago’s Ghost explains that he “lit the candles, and took from [his] portmanteau what [he] 
firmly believed to have been the first French novel ever produced at Morwick Farm.  It 
was one of the masterly and charming stories of Dumas the elder.  In five minutes I was 
in a new world, and my melancholy room was full of the liveliest French company.”xxxviii  
The French trial also functions to absorb the reader and remove quotidian concerns; as 
the individual nicknamed “the Cur” in The Guilty River recounts in his diary or 
confession, “The bookseller has found a second-hand copy of the French Trials, and has 
sent them to me (as he expresses it) ‘on approval.’  ‘I more than approve—I admire; and I 
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more than admire—I imitate.  These criminal stories are told with a dramatic power, 
which has impelled me to try if I can rival the clever French narrative. . . .  I cannot 
remember having read any novel with a tenth part of the interest that absorbed me, in 
constructing my imaginary train of circumstances.’”xxxix  If the French novel functions to 
enhance sentimental distraction, the French trial instead increases morbid obsession.   
The English and American trial reports are more difficult to classify, because they 
at once claimed to represent what had actually happened in a certain courtroom and 
simultaneously refrained from simply transcribing the events that took place.  The title 
pages and front matter thus contained assurances of authenticity such as “Impartially 
taken by a Gentleman of the Profession,” or “The following Report, although 
unsupported by a name, is given to the public with an assurance that it is impartial, 
correct, and minute—and what need a preface say more?,” or later, “From the Short-
Hand Notes of Marsh & Osbourne, Official Reporters of the Courts.”xl  The same 
documents would, however, sometimes acknowledge their own possible errors; as the 
Preface to the report of the 1871 trial of murderess Laura Fair, who had shot her married 
lover in front of his family, explained, “[b]elieving that this report of the proceedings on 
the trial will prove worthy the consideration not only of members of the Bar, to whom it 
will be invaluable, but, also, to the public generally; and hoping that a generous public 
will overlook and excuse the little inaccuracies to which we have already adverted, the 
volume is respectfully submitted by THE PUBLISHERS.”xli  Furthermore, these trial 
reports often assumed the generic form of sensation stories and were publicly received 
with the same fervor as fiction.xlii  They thus occupied an uncertain status, remaining 
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based upon fact, yet consumed by the ordinary public, and susceptible to the critique of 
potential inaccuracy.   
In a number of novels, Collins explores these legal documents and their newly 
expanded readership.  On the one hand, he inquires about the extent to which reports of 
cases can adequately depict what actually occurred, and evaluates them almost as an 
appellate tribunal would.  On the other, he asks about the uses—both serious and 
pleasurable—to which readers put the law books they encountered.  Many of his novels 
thus depict libraries containing legal volumes, which novice readers encounter for the 
first time.  Whereas Collins himself, having been legally trained at Lincoln’s Inn, could 
digest some of the more technical dimensions of works like Moak’s “Argument,”xliii his 
novels represent a range of readers more or less capable of evaluating the legal texts they 
undertake.  What emerges is an immanent critique of the belief that law will inevitably 
become more transparent with its increased accessibility to the ordinary reader, or that 
writing will itself render the representation of law more accurate.  Instead, Collins 
demonstrates, the very textuality of these legal documents may impede access to the 
posited “underlying” facts or law.  Likewise, the process of translating the trial from 
event into text inevitably introduces error.  At the same time, however, the rigorous 
reader, even if a novice, will ask the appropriate questions of the text and arrive (usually 
herself) at a less than credulous response to the document in question.  Two examples 
from Collins’ work exemplify these points.  In each, the privileged reader of the law—
like that of novels—is identified as female, and she reads not simply for an abstract 
lesson or enjoyment but rather attempts to question or apply the text within the pragmatic 
context of everyday life.    
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 In the 1875 novel The Law and the Lady, the heroine Valeria Woodville is 
perplexed as to the nature of a secret that seems to be plaguing her husband, Mr. Eustace 
Woodville, aka (as she has already discovered) Eustace Macallan.  Finding herself, on 
account of youth and attractiveness with some sway over one of her husband’s old 
friends, Major Fitz-David, Valeria persuades him to give her access to the possibility of 
discovering her husband’s secret.  Major Fitz-David does so by allowing Valeria free 
reign of his library for several hours.  While Valeria first assumes that the clue must be 
provided by an object or letter contained within this room—focusing in particular on a 
peculiar vase—she suddenly realizes that “the clue might quite as probably present itself 
in the form of a book.”xliv  As Valeria subsequently recounts her process of searching: 
I looked along the lower rows of shelves; standing just near enough to them to 
read the titles on the backs of the volumes.  I saw Voltaire in red morocco; 
Shakespeare in blue; Walter Scott in green; the History of England in brown; the 
Annual Register in yellow calf.  There I paused, wearied and discouraged already 
by the long rows of volumes.  How (I thought to myself) am I to examine all these 
books?  And what am I to look for, even if I do examine them all?xlv  
As she moves to higher shelves with the aid of a library ladder, Valeria discovers less 
uniform books, “some . . . bound in cloth; some . . . only protected by paper covers” as 
well as “empty spaces from which books had been removed and not replaced.”xlvi  She 
eventually alights upon a cupboard with a large, “gorgeously-bound book,” encased in 
blue velvet with “clasps of silver in beautiful arabesque patterns” and an accompanying 
silver lock.xlvii  Much to Valeria’s disappointment and disgust, this volume contains not 
the secret for which she is searching but instead locks of hair documenting each of Major 
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Fitz-David’s female conquests.  Almost giving up in despair at this point, Valeria is then 
interrupted by Major Fitz-David’s current paramour, who storms into the room and 
launches a verbal assault.  This jealous fit has fortuitous consequences.   
 When Valeria explains that she is simply in the library looking for a volume, 
rather than attempting to insinuate herself into the Major’s good graces, the girl inquires 
“Stop a bit! I wonder whether that’s the book you have been looking after?  Are you like 
me?  Do you like reading Trials?”  Valeria’s response is to think “Trials?  Had I heard her 
aright?  Yes: she had said, Trials.”xlviii  The girl then recovers the volume from a space 
between the bookcase and the wall where it had fallen, and hands it to Valeria, 
accompanied with the statement “I’ve read it twice over—I have.  Mind you, I believe he 
did it, after all.”xlix  When Valeria looks at the title page, she is struck by horror and 
immediately faints.  It reads: “A Complete Report of/ The trial of/ Eustace Macallan/ For 
the alleged poisoning/ of/ His Wife.”l  Although Macallan had not been convicted, he had 
not been acquitted either, but had suffered from the ignominy of what is called a “Scotch 
verdict,” or the verdict of “not proven” rather than “not guilty.”  When Eustace discovers 
that his new wife has learned of his past and of his prior identity, he flees, too ashamed to 
face her again.   
 This chain of events leads Valeria to an increased resolution, and she determines 
to get to the bottom of the circumstances leading to Eustace’s first wife’s death and to 
demonstrate her husband’s innocence.  In service of this pursuit, she reads the entirety of 
the trial.  Although an active and emotionally engaged reader from the beginning—as 
demonstrated by the fainting fit she had upon seeing the title page as well as an episode 
in which she admits to having torn out and trampled underfoot some displeasing pages of 
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the report—Valeria is initially somewhat naïve.  She believes, for instance, the claims of 
the report to be especially accurate.  As she recounts: 
Turning to the second page of the Trial, I found a Note, assuring the reader of the 
absolute correctness of the Report of the Proceedings.  The compiler described 
himself as having enjoyed certain privileges.  Thus, the presiding Judge had 
himself revised his charge to the Jury.  And, again, the chief lawyers for the 
prosecution and the defence, following the Judge’s example, had revised their 
speeches, for, and against, the prisoner.  Lastly, particular care had been taken to 
secure a literally correct report of the evidence given by various witnesses.  It was 
some relief to me to discover this Note, and to be satisfied at the outset that the 
Story of the Trial was, in every particular, fully and truly told.li    
Rather than suspecting that the Judge and lawyers might have taken the opportunity for 
revision to embellish rather than render accurate, Valeria gives credence to the account 
that the reporter provided.   
 It is revealed later in the novel that this faith was at least partially misplaced.  As 
Valeria digs behind the text of the trial report into the nature of the witnesses’ accounts 
and the background circumstances of the case, she discovers that the trial had been 
rendered logical and readable at some cost.  One of the chief witnesses for the defense 
had been a friend of Eustace’s, the aptly named Misserrimus Dexter, a man depicted as 
beautiful in his upper body yet lacking legs.  Whereas his testimony had seemed quite 
convincing in the context of the report, Valeria soon discovers that he is plagued by 
episodes of insanity.  Conversing with her mother-in-law, who has claimed that, “in 
asking Dexter’s advice . . . you appropriately consult a madman,” Valeria responds “You 
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surprise me very much . . . .  Mr Dexter’s evidence, given at the Trial, seems as clear and 
reasonable as evidence can be.”lii  Mrs. Macallan’s more sophisticated understanding of 
the nature of trial reports emerges from her response; to Valeria’s expression of surprise, 
her mother-in-law replies: 
“Of course it is!  The shorthand writers and reporters put his evidence into 
presentable language, before they printed it.  If you had heard what he really said, 
as I did, you would have been either very much disgusted with him, or very much 
amused by him, according to your way of looking at things.”liii  
The trial report thus forces the evidence into a coherent unity, at the expense of an 
accurate representation of the witnesses’ testimony.  The source for Collins’ question to 
Moak about whether he might have felt anxious or nervous or was ever less than 
coherent—circumstances not evident from the text of his argument—thus begins to 
emerge.    
  During the course of the novel, Valeria’s investigations teach her to be a critical 
reader of the trial report, refusing to accept the statements contained therein at face value.  
Not all novice legal readers that Collins represents, however, demonstrate the same 
learning curve.  For the happy couple in Armadale who wish to discover the legal 
mechanism that could enable their elopement, a perusal of Blackstone’s Commentaries 
on the Laws of England proves to provide only an obstacle to their anticipated marriage 
rather than any clues as to how that impediment could be overcome.  Allan Armadale is 
willing to marry without any thought of the legal consequences, but his prospective 
spouse, Neelie, insists that “I decline even to think of our marriage, till my mind is made 
easy first on the subject of the Law.”liv  When asked how this law is to be ascertained, 
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Neelie responds “Out of books, to be sure! There must be quantities of information in that 
enormous library of yours at the great house.  If you really love me, you won’t mind 
going over the backs of a few thousand books, for my sake!”lv  Blackstone, of course, 
furnishes the ideal source of legal knowledge for the lay person; having written his 
Commentaries to educate university students and legislators about the current state of 
English law, Blackstone avoided much of the arcana of law, as evinced by the 
instantaneous and continuing popularity of his work.lvi  After tallying up the negatives 
and positives from Blackstone under columns marked “good” and “bad”, they conclude 
that the marriage is impossible because of the lack of paternal consent.  Nor does Neelie 
stop there—she insists instead that Blackstone must not only contain the black letter of 
the law but also specify its enforcement mechanisms, which she imagines applied to their 
contemplated misdeeds: as Collins writes, “Shut up the book,” said Neelie, resignedly.  “I 
have no doubt we should find the police, and the prison, and the hair-cutting—all 
punishments for perjury, exactly as I told you!—if we looked at the next page.”lvii  Law 
books—or at least Blackstone—thus contain, for these readers, the direct injunctions of 
the law, which operate on their own without need for independent enforcement 
mechanisms.   
 In these contexts, Collins at once explores the distortions introduced into law and 
its instantiations by documents like trial reports or Blackstone’s reduction of the law for 
the non-specialist and investigates the effects of access to legal texts upon an expanded 
readership.  Although demonstrating that the law is not automatically rendered 
transparent by being recorded, and that unmediated access to the law may still leave the 
subject impenetrable to the reader, Collins at the same time provides a model of a reader 
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who can learn to be critical, who will ask how the protagonists experienced the trial, and 
how it ended.  While Moak and the newspapers may have lost sight of the ultimate 
outcome, this new, critical reader, would ascertain that Jesse Billings was acquitted after 
his second trial and that Moak himself was often subject to accusations of partiality from 
the other side.   
* * * 
For Collins, legal texts—like literature—retain their secrets.  These secrets are not, 
however, exactly theirs, but rather constitute the secrets of law, and its continued 
impenetrability despite increasing access to the sources that claim to represent it.  The 
very fact of law’s representation—whether it is that of Jesse Billings’ or Eustace 
Macallan’s trials or that of the niceties of English law regarding marriage—preserves 
law’s secrets.  The education of the “unknown public” and the naive reader therefore 
takes the form not of a tutelage in how to read correctly, or for the truth, but rather in how 
to read while acknowledging the secrets that law retains.  In the wake of each reading, the 
law keeps back a particular remainder, one that may create an incentive for ever more 
texts of explanation and simplification, but will never be entirely exhausted. 
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